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The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations can be seen as a milestone in the recent history of UN’s endeavours to mitigate the impact of wars and civil violence. Conventionally kno-
wn as the Brahimi Report – named after the panel’s 
chairman Lakhdar Brahimi – it was commissioned 
to analyse the history of peacekeeping operations, to 
assess their challenges and ‘to make frank, specific 
and realistic recommendations for change’.1 The report 
was made available by UN’s Secretary-General on August 
2000, a time when the organization had already collected 
a series of setbacks, failures and rich experiences from the 
overwhelming number of peacekeeping operations throu-
ghout the 1990s. Never in history had the UN been de-
manded so much to take on complex and numerous roles 
in averting conflicts. In a time when the organization in-
creasingly prioritized discussions on internal reforms, the 
Brahimi Report looked into the future and reorganization 
of peacekeeping operations – surely the most visible and 
judged functions of the United Nations.
In 2010, the Brahimi Report completes ten years and 
has contributed to vigorous discussions on the feasibility of 
its recommendations. It raised critical points on the needs 
of conflict prevention, on the limitations of information 
gathering and planning, on the delays to engage, as well 
as on general operational hindrances faced by the United 
Nations. However, the Brahimi Report concentrated on te-
chnical areas instead of drawing an essential focus on po-
litics and political strategies that peacekeeping operations 
should consider in the field. If the UN is a political organi-
zation par excellence and increasingly engaged in building 
institutions, in social engineering and in consolidating 
governance arrangements, it must confront the unending 
challenges faced in the interaction with local political do-
mains. This has a special meaning when considering com-
plex peacebuilding scenarios and when the UN acts as a 
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transitional authority (such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan and 
East Timor).  This article focuses on such political areas 
that have been missed out by the Brahimi Report – either 
unintentionally or on purpose. The objective is to contri-
bute to a more general reflection on the political challenges 
faced by the UN since the launch of such report almost a 
decade ago. 
For such reflection to take place, the case of the UN in-
tervention in East Timor provides unequivocal lessons of 
how sensitized the operation should have been concerning 
local political issues in order to sustain peace and gover-
nance. This article covers issues overlooked in East Timor 
in order to understand the deficiencies of the Brahimi 
Report and to apply such lessons to the political challenges 
in contemporary peacebuilding missions. For that, a focus 
is drawn onto the level of participation granted to local 
political forces from the start of a UN operation. These les-
sons are able to fill in a part of the gaps concerning politi-
cal recommendations in the Brahimi Report. Accordingly, 
they intend to expand the analysis on the deficiencies of 
UN complex peacebuilding operations in light of the ap-
proaching 10-year birthday of such report.
UN’s transitional authority (versus ?) local politics
When the Brahimi Report was launched in 2000, not 
only the UN Secretariat wanted to exorcize haunting me-
mories from failed missions, but the report was born into a 
transforming era of peacebuilding doctrine. One year later, 
a new paradigm would be expressed into the Responsibility 
to Protect report and later endorsed by the United Nations. 
It argued that international security should be centred 
on people and not exclusively on states. State sovereignty 
would depend on complying with perceived state func-
tions, such as guaranteeing the concept of human security. 
Amartya Sen argues that this would involve the creation 
of ‘political, social, environmental, economic, military and 
cultural systems that together give people the building blo-
cks of survival, livelihood, and dignity’.2 If a state systema-
tically and chronically defies its responsibilities, the inter-
national community (legally through the UN) would have 
to be held responsible for intervening. The new doctrine 
breaks with the traditional Westphalian world of ‘airtight’ 
sovereignties, and thus, has provided an ethical basis to le-
gitimise full scale interventions in the name of humanita-
rian protection.
This new ethos has been crucial in the last decade of 
complex peacebuilding interventions, particularly where 
the UN has acted as an interim government. In these new 
types of mandates, comprehensive approaches are under-
taken in order to promote the broader concept of human 
security. Therefore, not only military or policing measures 
are put in place – in tune with traditional peacekeeping – 
but also measures to foster social, political and economic 
development. 
Additionally, the fact that complex interventions had 
to deal with local political arenas prompted the UN to be 
heavily concerned with promoting governance. According 
to Kofi Annan, ‘good governance at the local, national, and 
international levels is perhaps the single most important 
factor in promoting development and advancing the cause 
of peace’.3 Governance is a decision-making process that is 
‘participatory, consensus orientated, accountable, transpa-
rent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and in-
clusive, and it follows the rule of law’.4 In light of this, this 
article maintains that the UN has failed to comply with se-
veral basic criteria of governance, especially participation, 
inclusiveness and responsiveness to local demands and reali-
ties. This failure is due to misunderstanding and neglect of 
the dynamics of local politics – an aspect that should have 
been assessed more thoroughly by the Brahimi Report.
When the UN assumes the role of an interim gover-
nment, the organization has to deal directly with local 
political dynamics in order to guarantee the success of 
peacebuilding goals. Transitional administrations aim ‘to 
rescue people from the effects of arbitrary or ineffective 
government and to help them acquire the skills needed 
for stable enlightened self-rule’.5 As Guttieri and Piombo 
note, interim governments bridge old and new orders of 
rule and ‘occurs in a hinge in history, a central point upon 
which future national – and at times international – stabi-
lity depends’.6 Due to the nature of interim governments 
headed by UN peacebuilding mandates, they offer valuable 
examples of the tensions created between the arriving in-
ternational political structure and the political life in place. 
These tensions are central in defining the 
quality of governance strategies and the 
prospects for long-term political stability.
The operation in East Timor by 
UNTAET7 between 1999 and 2001 has re-
presented so far the apex of UN’s functio-
nal role, where it had an ‘ultimate authori-
ty of a kind that in the contemporary international system 
is reserved for sovereign states’.8 However, the experience 
is not isolated in history. It seems to be an evolution of the 
UN towards increasingly complex operations, particularly 
where it is demanded to be a transitional government – si-
milar to what actual countries have undertaken in manda-
tes from the League of Nations and in trusteeships. Suhrke 
recalls previous examples in Cambodia and Kosovo, while 
Mortimer suggests that in the future ‘the demand for in-
ternational intervention and administration is potentially 
very large’.9 Therefore, if this tendency grows, the Timorese 
example can enlighten some of the do’s and don’ts on how 
When the UN assumes the role of an interim 
government, the organization has to deal directly with 
local political dynamics in order to guarantee the 
success of peacebuilding goals.
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the UN should act more effectively in local political arenas.
Hybrid administrations: respect to local political life
When Security Council Resolution 1272 authorised 
UNTAET as the new peacebuilding operation in East 
Timor, it prescribed full authority to the transitional ad-
ministrator to hold executive, legislative and security po-
wers. The designated SRSG (Special Representative of the 
Secretary General) was Sergio Vieira de Mello. His mission 
aimed to bridge the long colonial past of the territory to a 
future of complete independence – an autonomy expres-
sed in both developmental and political dimensions.  
However, as long as absolute powers were concentrated 
around one person immune from prosecution according 
to international law, UN’s transitional administration in 
East Timor was more alike benevolent despotism – as De 
Mello himself recognized later.10 Jarat Chopra critically 
called UNTAET the ‘UN’s Kingdom of East Timor’, while 
others compared De Mello’s powers as ‘those of a Roman 
provincial governor’.11 The concentration of absolute po-
wers added to deficient planning of the transitional admi-
nistration in East Timor, to a misunderstanding of the lo-
cal political environment, and to a lack of clear guidelines 
on political interactions between international and domes-
tic authorities. 
Too much attention was given to build a civil service 
in the weberian perspective – that is, apolitical, neutral, 
bureaucratic and embodying rational-legal authority. This 
was probably justifiable due to the emergency to foster de-
velopment in East Timor and to counter pressing humani-
tarian issues. On this, the UN had already proven to per-
form effectively in some operations in the past. However, 
the process of institutionalization cannot precede politics. 
In the case of East Timor, the fact it had never had an indi-
genous state does not mean it was an empty political shell, 
or terra nullis as called by Suhrke. In line with Chopra and 
Hohe, 
There is never a vacuum of power on the ground. Even 
when there is the complete absence of an identifiable state 
government or any semblance of government institutions 
(…) traditional structure evolve, social organization is re-
defined, and people continue to survive, filling the space.12 
The reluctance to recognize Timorese political forces 
and to involve them from the start had negative impacts on 
the legitimacy and effectiveness of UNTAET. It also proved 
troublesome for the stability of East Timor. 
Since the first movements for independence consolida-
ted in 1975, the territory has counted with growing natio-
nalist forces and political organizations that channelled the 
approach of national unity. Although there were different 
factions and views in such movement, the leader Xanana 
Gusmao skilfully managed to arrange them under a single 
political umbrella favouring independence – that is, the 
CNRT or the National Council of Timorese Resistance. 
As Goldstone argues, the CNRT therefore proved to be the 
‘obvious choice’ in the search for an interlocutor in the ear-
ly days of the mission.13 The UN Department of Political 
Affairs (DPA) had already used the CNRT 
as the prevalent Timorese voice in negotia-
tions much before the deployment of the 
transitional administration. Nonetheless, 
why did the UNTAET decided to see 
Xanana Gusmao and the CNRT as distant 
consultants and not as early constructive 
players in government decisions? 
There is no doubt that the UN principle of neutrality is 
fundamental to understand such attitude. As Suhrke notes, 
this is the ‘dominant institutional culture in the DPKO’14, 
namely the Department of Peacekeeping Operations held 
responsible for the mission. The dilemma lied on the fact 
that ‘the CNRT was not a sovereign entity, [being] relegated 
to the conceptual category of a faction’.15 As elections were 
the later objective anyway, representative political forces 
could arguably be legitimised democratically after the UN 
mission constructed proper institutions and frameworks. 
However, although the principle of neutrality and the res-
pect for elections must be privileged always, they cannot 
override local political authorities and structures in place. 
In East Timor, the early vision of the transitional adminis-
tration seemed to be: as I cannot work with everybody or 
anybody, I prefer to work with nobody. 
As Chopra notes, ‘while De Mello has tried to avoid 
politicizing the environment, a transitional administration 
cannot afford to be above politics’.16 In this case, the CNRT 
was not a party or mere faction, but a ‘distinctive creature, 
requiring a different approach’.17 The CNRT ‘overwhelmin-
gly represented pro-independence political perspectives’.18 
Therefore, the recognition of the CNRT as a player was 
possible and desirable without colliding against DPKO’s 
standards and institutional culture. Neutrality is definitely 
a principle, but should not be a dogma. This is especially 
relevant when prevailing and legitimate political actors are 
recognized to channel some of the identities and anxieties 
of the local population. A transitional administration, ai-
ming to affirm its own authority and effectiveness, should 
not put this aside. 
In practical terms, the failure to promote political in-
clusiveness from the beginning has a negative impact onto: 
(a) the legitimacy of the international administration; (b) 
the coherence between institutional models and future po-
litical arrangements; and (c) the ex-post governance, po-
As long as absolute powers were concentrated around 
one person immune from prosecution according to 
international law, UN’s transitional administration of 
East Timor was alike benevolent despotism, as Sergio 
Vieira de Mello himself recognized later.
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litical stability and development. Therefore, participation 
is not only a matter of abiding to liberal principles. It is 
primarily a pragmatic approach to overcome major chal-
lenges faced by complex peacebuilding operations.
Concerning legitimacy, it is undeniable that the United 
Nations enjoys a popular perception as an organization 
working for the “greater good” and one that is legally sup-
ported by international standards. At least in East Timor, 
that was the mood at the reception of UNTAET, as it ‘en-
joyed a degree of legitimacy, chiefly as the agency of East 
Timor’s coming to independence’.19 However, as argued 
before, East Timor had never been an empty political shell. 
Traditional authorities ruled villages, while pro-indepen-
dent leaders (mainly in the CNRT) seemed to condense 
broader nationalist forces. Therefore, a fault line was pre-
sent between de jure legitimacy of the transitional admi-
nistrator and de facto legitimacy gravitating around indi-
genous political voices.20 Furthermore, the UNTAET did 
not manage ‘to enjoy the legitimacy that was expected to 
accrue to the elected indigenous government that it was 
mandated to create’.21 Therefore, in line with Goldstone’s 
arguments, it ‘exemplified a tension inherent in UNTAET’s 
mandate, between the extraordinary powers theoretically 
available to it and the limited powers that it was able to 
exercise in practice’.22 
As seen in the case of East Timor, the UN transitional 
administration had a peak of legitimacy at its beginning 
and then gradually fell. The “benevolent” absolute powers 
of the De Mello soon began to echo imperial or neo-co-
lonialist impressions.  As Guttieri and Piombo put it, ‘the 
responsibility to protect introduces a new paternalism that 
overrides the notion of indigenous rights to rule’.23 From 
that point, the UNTAET started to be more inclusive only 
after strong international and local pressures. Albeit such 
flexibilization, the transitional administration was far from 
letting Timorese to have an active participation in civil ser-
vice and in political decision-making until elections were 
held.  
The pragmatic importance of maintaining a more 
constant level of legitimacy lies on the fact that transitio-
nal administrations must buy time. Time is essential not 
only to build stable institutions and local skills, but also to 
accommodate political elites, to lever local support, to bu-
ffer dilapidating criticisms, and to prepare the population 
for democratic elections. Including political elites from the 
start make them feel part of the process and it benefits the 
transitional administration with essential insights into the 
local culture, popular anxieties and into several peculia-
rities of the country. Inclusiveness is not only a strategy 
to discourage criticisms that taint the legitimacy of peace-
building operations; rather, it is an effective in-job-training 
of governance. It allows mutual adaptation: first, the ad-
justment of the international structure into local demands 
and realities; and, in exchange, the adjustment of politi-
cal elites into the institutional frameworks set by accepted 
international standards and procedures. Richard Caplan 
argues that ‘early devolution of responsibility allows the 
local population to learn from their experiences under the 
watchful eye of international specialists who may not be 
able to remain very long in a territory’.24 It is normal for 
transitional governments to be reluctant to involve local 
political authorities into the early stages of intervention – 
particularly when they had been the belligerent parties be-
forehand. Nonetheless, although involving political elites 
into early decision-making does not guarantee success, not 
involving them is a certain path to failure.
In the case of elections, if they do represent a pivotal 
point when political participation and sovereignty is fi-
nally returned to the local population, then its importance 
impels a greater level of preparation. The thorough resear-
ch conducted by Andrea Molnar reveals that one month 
prior to elections ‘many people were still confused as to 
what elections [were] about’.25 Furthermore, ‘not a single 
person polled cited elections as an important aspect of de-
mocracy’.26 These facts verify that the Timorese population 
was not yet prepared to liberal and democratic institutions 
only 20 months after the beginning of UNTAET. 
There is no doubt that elections should 
have been postponed and that ‘elections 
cannot be held too early in the process to 
allow new political forces to coalesce into 
coherent parties capable of running elec-
tion campaigns’.27 In fact, however, elec-
tions would not have managed to be pos-
tponed since UNTAET could not withs-
tand anymore those political pressures de-
manding devolution of power. Arguably, 
if it had been inclusive enough from the start, UNTAET 
could enjoy a longer legitimacy lifespan and effectiveness. 
In the attempt to prepare a country for independence 
or for a stable post-conflict reality, the UN is compelled to 
review its attitudes on what level of interaction it should 
have with local political players. As Dahrendorf recalls in 
the case of East Timor, UNTAET faced the existential di-
lemma of either being a political player or a political arbi-
ter.28 However, instead of adopting one or the other alter-
native, a via media could be envisaged. A dual or hybrid 
transitional government between international and local 
political elites should be pursued. If coexistence in executi-
ve and legislative spheres proves to be impossible, then the 
The reluctance to recognize Timorese political forces 
and to involve them from the start had negative 
impacts on the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
UNTAET. The fact that East Timor had never had 
an indigenous state does not mean it was an empty 
political shell.
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separation of legal and political authority could be another 
arrangement – as conceptualized by the UN/DPA.29
As transitional administrations have been the most 
complex and fragile operations conducted by the UN and 
international coalitions in the last decade, not only opera-
tional and technical hindrances should be analysed. Ten 
years after the Brahimi Report, good governance will be 
achieved only after more thorough assessments and frank 
recommendations decide to outspoken the political en-
gineering among international administrations, national 
players and traditional authorities at local levels.
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